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DO AMERICAN CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS HAVE A
DISTINCTIVE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION?
Whether man is aware of it or not, there is a philosophy
implicit in everything he does. Theory underlies all prac-
tice. Man's ideas, his institutions, his entire way of life, if
examined carefully, will reveal that his outlook toward life
is, for example, either realistic, idealistic, or perhaps a com-
posite of the two. One could spend countless hours at-
tempting to determine the basic theories upon which man
operates. Philosophers down through the centuries have
striven to determine the fundamental theories of the uni-
verse. Through their efforts the science of philosophy has
been established, which in studying the nature, origin, and
purpose of the universe, has given man a greater perception
of his own end, and so has supplied direction and motiva-
tion to his efforts. This article will not attempt to treat
of those divisions of philosophy which deal with man or
with the universe, but it will be confined to one limited and
particular aspect: an examination of the philosophy of
American Catholic legal education. This article shall con-
sider the nature, origin, and purpose of this type of legal
education.
Before examining the present status of American Catho-
lic legal education, one must look first at the nature of
American law-for that is 'the basic material with which
American Catholic law schools have had to deal. Ameri-
can law had its immediate roots in the English Common
Law. But what philosophy influenced the English Common
Law and so, in turn, the American Common Law? It can
be said that no schools of philosophy, such as the Idealistic
School or the Realist School, had direct influence on the
development of the Common Law either -in England or
America. The legists, in general, knew little philosophy as
such, and the philosophers knew little law; hence, formal
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philosophy of any kind made little direct contribution to
the early Common Law.' However, haphazard selections
from various philosophies were in evidence. The law grew
more by chance and necessity than by plan: 2
The common law at very least has been essentially a
process of thwarting injustice rather than a system to incul-
cate justice. This was inevitable since it was allowed to
grow out of necessity rather than to fashion that necessity.
Its chronicle establishes that it was originally a very crude
organism to wreak vengeance for injustice done and pos-
sibly to render unlikely a future malfeasance. . . It de-
veloped "self-help" at first and communal retribution later.
Quite early in its history, the English Common Law
found itself hampered by narrow forms of pleading and by
lack of remedy. Thus the Common Law courts failed to
satisfy the needs of the people. To meet these demands,
another court system, Equity, arose. In 'the Equity courts
the ecclesiastical chancellors, who were the judges, took the
dictates of natural justice found in the Roman and Canon
Laws and incorporated them into their decisions. Subse-
quently, these principles of Natural Law found their way
into the Common Law, because the latter, jealous of
Equity's usurping of its jurisdiction, extended itself to meet
some of its former deficiencies. Many of the Common Law
judges7 while ignoring philosophy formally, yet were of the
view that the law was concerned with what ought to be
done; and so actually principles of ethics and metaphysics
were presumed by these judges in making their decisions.
Hence, a philosophical standard or norm, although never
clearly stated, was presumed to exist. Thus -the great
anomaly of the English Common Law is that while ostensi-
bly it ignored philosophy, yet it used many philosophical
principles. This use of philosophy, however, was a species
I Dillon, Philosophy in Law and Government, 13 AmmucA CATH1oLc
P~rr.osopwcAL Assoc=Tzox Pocwn.ros 3 (1937).
2 Dlon, Philosophy in the Commonz Law, 9 AmmecAN CATHoLc PHILo-
soPmCAL AssocIATiON PocEwnrGs 178 (1933).
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of opportunism.3 The great influence of a Plato, an Aris-
totle or a Thomas Aquinas only sporadically or haphazard-
ly made itself felt in the law. Of course, it was inevitable
in an age and a civilization so largely dominated by that
school of philosophy known as Scholasticism, that such in-
fluence would be felt.4 The dictates of natural justice em-
phasized in Scholasticism were intentionally used by the
Equity judges, while the Common Law judges, as previous-
ly stated, often presumed the existence of these, if not ex-
pressly recognizing them as such. Their general formal
ignoring of them is due to the fact that:5
While the Roman and Canon laws were being taught in
the continental and British universities and were being
consciously and deliberately molded by the Schoolmen and
by lawmakers, under the impact of the ethics, psychology,
theodicy, and metaphysics of scholasticism so as to fabri-
cate a jural order which would strengthen Christian civiliza-
tion, the study of the Common Law of England, focused
at the Inns of Court at London, beyond the reach of Oxford
and Cambridge, became the monopoly of an autonomous,
self-governing, legal profession, or group, analogous to a
guild or craft. From about the fourteenth to the middle
of the eighteenth century, or until the introduction of the
study of the Common Law into Oxford University by Sir
William Blackstone, the English Bar maintained exclusive
control over all education in the laws of England. Since
the teaching and study of the Common Law and Equity
in the English universities did not commence until well
after the Reformation, there was no opportunity there for
the genesis of a tradition of a scholastically guided ethico-
socio-juristic synthesis.
Thus we see that because of historical accident, Scho-
lastic Philosophy had no opportunity to walk hand in hand
with the English Common Law; however, because of the
influence of the Equity judges, and to a lesser extent be-
cause of the "sense of rightness" possessed by the Common
8 Dillon, Philosophy in Law and Government, 13 Anrmsc CATHoLm
PmosopHicA AssociTiozi PitOCEEDiNGs 4 (1937).
4 Id. at 6, 7.
5 Brown, Catholic Education and the Law in VrrAL PROLmS OF CATHo-
riC EDuCATION 3N r UNaim STATES 219 (Deferrari ed. 1939).
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Law judges, some of Scholasticism's basic ideas, such as
free will and the consequent personal responsibility for hu-
man acts, became fundamental in Common Law theory.
The belief in the ability of the judge to decide cases on
the basis of reason, the existence of rules and principles,
the acknowledgment of God-given law, and a system of
formal logic are other important Scholastic contributions to
the Common Law.
When the English colonists arrived in this country, they
brought with them and made effective that part of the Eng-
lish Common Law which was applicable to local conditions.
The growing mistreatment of the colonists 'by the Crown
and the simultaneous growth in the desire for independ-
ence resulted in a revolution which had not only military
and political, but philosophical effects. Guided by the hand
of Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence pro-
claimed to the world the existence of a Creator; that man
was endowed by this Creator with certain rights; that these
rights were inalienable; and that governments were insti-
tuted to secure these divinely endowed personal rights.
Thus was born a nation that deliberately was guided
toward the political vitalization of Christian concepts of
law: ,
The written record leaves no doubt and permits of no
discussion that our system of government and laws was
grounded in the fundamental teachings of Christian philo-
sophy. The Declaration of Independence--the first docu-
ment emanating from any group having competence to speak
for what subsequently became the United States of America
-- assumes and is predicated on a supernatural sanction and
hypothesis and indubitably professes the Christian concept
of society and man . . . The Constitution of the United
States blueprints and sets up a political mechanism or de-
vice to give organic vitality to this philosophy, and as the
Supreme Court of the United States has said, the Con-
stitution "is but the body and the letter," of which "the
6 Desvernine, PhlMosophy and Order in Law, 17 AhmmacAN CArouc
PmmoPncL AssaocrioN PRocmm3xGs 130 (1941).
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Declaration of Independence is the thought and the spirit,
and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence." This is
the accepted doctrine.
With such Christian theory as a basic characteristic of
our American law, it would be expected that American
Catholic law schools not only would be conscious of such
heritage from the start, but would be active to ensure that
American law remain Christian. There have been strivings
in that direction, but unfortunately this ideal has been ex-
tremely difficult of achievement. The originating period
of the Catholic law school, which extended from about
1869 to 1929,7 was devoted principally to the hard task
of merely "existing and increasing." No single reason ex-
plains the birth of Catholic law schools; complex motives
account for 'their existence.' Most of them have been es-
tablished in the great metropolitan centers where the need
of training practicing lawyers had to be met. Some arose
in response to the general urgings of a local bench and bar,
who believed that a university type of legal education
would raise the standards of such education. Others
emerged from expanding Catholic universities. It must be
kept in mind that during the early part of this originating
period the American Bar was attempting to change over
from the former haphazard system of training lawyers in
law offices to the more systematic training that a law school
could give. Hence, Catholic law schools as well as others
were established, in part, to meet this need. One must not
lose sight of the fact, also, that the American people fav-
ored that type of legal education which was content merely
to prepare men to practice law in order that they might
"earn a good living." With perhaps few exceptions, there-
fore, Catholic law schools were originated and developed
with little, if any, thought to their juristic responsibilities
7 Brown, The Place of the Catholic Law School in American Education,
5 DrRorr L. REv. 4 (1941).
8 Id. at5.
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beyond making it possible for students to prepare for bar
examinations and ultimately to make a living practicing
law: '
In this first cycle, the general aim of Catholic law schools
was to train for a profession which ought to be learned and
cultured, but which is always necessarily vocational . . .
These schools were Catholic in "spirit," "attitude," and
"environment," but the positive law was generally taught
for its .own sake and the pedagogical functions were secu-
larized. Perhaps only in exceptional instances was there the
idea of giving expression and effect in the teaching pro-
cesses to a distinctive philosophical tradition and sociological
outlook.
There is little doubt that Catholic law schools from the
outset taught the American and Christian doctrine of the
inalienable rights of man in their Constitutional Law
courses; but it is apparent, also, that generally they failed
to analyze the Common Law -in the light of Scholastic phil-
osophical principles. They were too busy teaching their
students the mechanical aspects of practicing law.
The second period of the Catholic law school might be
said to have extended from 1929 to 1941.0 This has been
called the "aspirant era," because it was during this time
that many of these schools were engaged in obtaining an
accredited standing from the two main accrediting agencies,
the Association of American Law Schools and the Ameri-
can Bar Association. During this period there was, to
some extent, a growing awareness that the schools must
teach the student to scrutinize American law in the light
of the moral law, as well as instruct such students in the
mechanics of practice. Gradually these schools began to
apprehend that this was a task especially suited for them,
and was a duty to be carried out if they were to achieve
their proper end as Catholic law schools. Little concrete




phasized the religious facilities they provided for the de-
velopment of the law students, but such facilities were con-
fined within the field of religion and did not directly bring
the moral law to bear upon the positive law as the students
studied it in their courses.
The third or "retrenchment" period 11 existed during the
Second World War. Faced with an acute shortage of stu-
dents, Catholic law schools, as well as others, had to con-
centrate upon self-preservation. After 1945, the "G. I.
Bill of Rights" brought such an avalanche of students to
all law schools that acute "growing pains" developed. This
initiated the fourth period of the American Catholic law
school. In its commencement physical problems again be-
came foremost to such schools. However, this immediate
problem did not obliterate the continuing problem of a lack
of Natural Law integration in the courses offered. It is
true that most Catholic law schools presently offer, and
have offered for sometime, courses in Legal Ethics, Juris-
prudence, and the like, in which they attempt to impart a
Scholastic concept of the law. Also, at least one law school,
the College of Law of the University of Notre Dame, has
found time and opportunity in the post-war era to inaugu-
rate a series of annual Natural Law Institutes designed to
revitalize the Scholastic concept of the Natural Law. While
all such efforts are aimed in the right direction, little has
been attempted, let alone accomplished, to point up the in-
dispensable role of the moral law in each of the courses of
the legal curriculum.
The thesis thus submitted, then, is that American Cath-
olic law schools have not adequately attempted to integrate
the moral law with the positive law courses. Instead they
have relegated the teaching of the moral law to a separate
course or two, thus keeping its existence in a vacuum apart
from the life which it must help to mold or shape. In view
11 Id. at 15.
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of the Christian philosophy at the base of American law,
the opportunity to integrate the moral with the positive
law is great; in view of the great heritage of the Natural
Law available in an especial way to Catholic law schools,
the duty to do so is plain; and in view of the rise and de-
velopment of generally well-meaning but incomplete and
even false philosophies of law, the need is urgent.
Keeping in mind the underlying Christian concepts of
American common law, and the evolution of American
Catholic law schools, one must next examine the develop-
ment of important philosophies of American law to under-
stand more of the great difficulties with which Catholic
Law schools have had to cope. Besides their problems rela-
tive to physical growth, self-preservation, and expansion,
they have had to cope with very influential theories of the
nature and function of law which were not always in accord
with a Scholastic philosophy of law. In comparatively re-
cent times, in both England and America, five dominant
schools of jurisprudence have made themselves strongly
felt: the Analytical, Historical, Sociological, Realist, and
Philosophical schools. These schools have either contained
only partial truth, and as a consequence failed to present
the entire picture of the nature of law, or have contained
elements of falsity which even more seriously have distorted
law's true nature. The thinking generated by these schools
has sprung primarily from a few important men, and has
been espoused by enough followers to influence the law
and legal education. Because the methods of the Catholic
law schools have been largely imitative, the various philoso-
phies of law emanating from these schools of jurisprudence
have been taught in Catholic law schools, in part at least,
without sufficient awareness of their deficiencies or distor-
tions. The failure to realize all the implications of a given
view of the nature of law has often resulted in an unwise
assent by Catholic law school professors to fundamentally
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objectionable laws. The lack of training in Scholastic Phil-
osophy on the part of many of these professors also has
played its part in engendering this uncritical approach.
A brief examination of some of the most elementary as-
pects of these five philosophies of law is necessary if one
is to see the great stress that each of them places on some
one particular aspect of the law. Several of the five origi-
nated in England and were transplanted to America through
the Common Law. The Analytical School of Jurisprudence
is one of these.
We have seen how the English Bar maintained exclusive
control over legal education from the Fourteenth to the
Eighteenth Century. The study of the Common Law of
England was kept in the hands of the legal profession at
the Inns of Court, out of reach of the English universities,
and away from the influence of any unifying Christian phil-
osophy. Following the Reformation, the previously unify-
ing influence of Christian theology tended to give way. And
so, when the Common Law and Equity jurisprudence final-
ly found its way into the English universities, there was
not sufficient reaction on the part of the university profes-
sors to resist the established precedents of the English Bar
in legal education. Generally speaking, these universities
adopted the analytical type of jurisprudence which existed
at the Inns of Court and in the Common Law Courts: 12
Insofar as the English universities departed from the
scholastic tradition and relied upon an analytical juris-
prudence, fostering the concept of law as a mere scientific
arrangement of rules, the notion of law was torn from its
context of life and the "legal man" was eventually made to
dwell in a make-believe world, devoid of ethics, politics,
and sociology.
The Reformation signaled the death of theology as the uni-
fying factor in all knowledge. It likewise brought dis-
agreement over Christian metaphysics and so in time les-
12 Brown, Lega2 Education in Philosophica Perspective, 3 DEmor L. Rrv.
183 (194o).
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sened the influence of Christian philosophy on the law.
This setting, together with the monopoly of the English
Bar over legal education for four centuries, furnished a
fertile soil for the growth of an analytical view of law.
Analytical jurists tried to discover their theory and basic
conception of law by a logical process, using as data merely
existing legal rules, principles, and precedents. Lacking
the influence of ethics and philosophy, these jurists en-
visioned law in too narrow a sense, devoid of the light
which ethics and philosophy could throw upon the nature
of law. Such a blindly logical system was more concerned
with making its rules and court decisions consistent than
with looking outside of the positive law for its basic prin-
ciples, and considering all the facts in order to achieve
justice. This theory found its way into the Common Law
of America as well as of England. American law, too, be-
came precedent-following, overly analytical and overly nar-
row, as well as too unconcerned with justice. Early court
procedure in this country became so technical that many
times a person's lawsuit was completely dismissed solely
because of the lawyer's improper pleading. Catholic legal
education, as well as non-Catholic, reflected this condition.
As a consequence, when American universities first "taught
law," following the period of law office training in colonial
America: I
. .. legal education consisted substantially in the com-
munication of abstract, legal principles regarded more or
less as eternal and unchangeable, and existent in a factual
vacuum, by a teacher at lectures, or by reference to such
secondary sources as textbooks and commentaries, intended
to be memorized by the student. Emphasis was placed upon
general principles, while the pursuit of facts was relegated
to the occasional reading of a case report or statute by
way of illustration.
The Historical School of Law prevailed in the Nineteenth
Century, particularly in the latter half thereof. Savigny.
18 Id. at 185.
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and the followers of this philosophy did not view law as
something which had always been the same, but as some-
thing which had grown over the years. Instead of eternal
and unchangeable rules, members of this school were overly
impressed with the phenomenon of growth in the law.
Legal generalizations were synthesized through the study
of the evolution of legal rules and doctrines. These came
to be regarded as universal conceptions, especially those de-
rived from comparative studies of all legal systems. Thus,
despite the changes evident in the law over the centuries,
stability was found therein through establishing principles
of growth. The Historical School found the ways in which
growth had taken place and would continue to occur, and
thus sought to unify stability and change by a combination
of historical authority and a sort of philosophical history.
The natural outgrowth of this viewpoint was the develop-
ment of the "case method" of studying law. Because of a
drift from principle to precedent, and because law was not
codified, the Common Law could be found only by examin-
ing the reports of single cases which had been accumulating
for eight centuries. The lack of a standard outside of the
positive law, and the lack of a unifying philosophy within,
breeded illogical and contradictory decisions. The previous
attempts of the Analytical jurists to be consistent brought
fantastic distinctions, and woundrous fictions. Therefore,
the only way fully to understand these confused Common
Law rules, as Langdell, the author of the case system,
noted, was to seek an explanation in history. To master
these rules effectively, seeing all the limitations and exten-
sions one would have to study the cases in which these
rules were embodied. Begun in 1870, the case method
was adopted by the majority of American law schools in
the early 1900's. Among these were the Catholic schools.' 4
14 "The case method of classroom instruction by which the reports of
actually adjudicated, selected cases are studied, analyzed and discussed by the
class under the direction of the teacher, is used as the basic educative process
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Because of the drift from principle to precedent, this sys-
tem stresses the searching of cases for facts rather than
concentrating attention upon principles. The deductive
way of thinking formerly employed so extensively by the
Analytical legal philosophers was replaced by an inductive
approach. Instead of reasoning from principles -to facts,
the reasoning was from facts to principles. "Apparently a
science of law was to emerge ultimately from legal fact
accumulations." 15
Since the Catholic law schools were largely imitative of
the non-Catholic ones, one can conclude that they were not
fully aware of the limitations inherent in both the analytic-
al approach to the law and the case method approach. Pos-
sibly they were too concerned with training practicing law-
yers in a narrowly technical sense only, or possibly they
were too insecure to resist following. Had they possessed
active awareness, they would have reacted more vigorously
against the separation of law from philosophy, and especi-
ally from ethics. Undoubtedly, they would have rejected
the narrow, logical view of the Analytical School, and
would have been a powerful factor in bringing earlier re-
forms to the overly-technical and unjust Common Law
pleading system which prevailed in our courts. Likewise,
false conceptions of Natural Law (which considered it in-
dividualistic), perhaps would not have taken root. The
wholesale adoption of the case method by most Catholic
law schools indicates that they did not fully comprehend
the road down which the system led. These schools began
to over-emphasize the facts and to under-emphasize the
principles. They attempted -to build a science of the law
merely by accumulating more and more facts. Induction
was over-emphasized while deduction from moral postulates
in most Catholic law schools." Brown, The Place of the Catholic Law School
in American Education, 5 DEmoir L. REv. 11, 12 (1941).
15 Brown, Legal Education in Philosophical Perspective, 3 D=or L. REv.
185 (1940).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
was too often neglected. Forgotten was the realization
that proper growth comes not only from a greater accumu-
lation of facts but also from a greater -insight into prin-
ciples. Evidently these schools began to lose sight of the
higher law by which all positive laws must be tested. Thus,
the Catholic law schools joined the secular ranks of all
American legal education to "religiously" follow the Analyt-
ical and Historical Schools.
The third stage in American legal education commenced
in the middle twenties under the motivation of the Socio-
logical jurists. The search for facts was now extended be-
yond the cases. As Robert Hutchins has said, there
U... was an effort to follow the law in action, to find out
the consequences of legal decisions, and what was actually
going on in the legal world." 1 The quest for facts was
extended from the domain of law into the social sciences
generally, and into economics, sociology, and politics par-
ticularly. The former, narrow notion of the Analytical
School which limited law to a merely logical arrangement of
rules was rejected. It was realized that law had been torn
from other vital data that properly belonged to it. Data
from economics, politics, sociology and the like were seen
to be necessary to a more just solution of multiplying social
problems stemming largely from the Industrial Revolution.
Referring to the Sociological School, in lamenting the eco-
nomic and moral crimes of the 1920's and 1930's one
writer says: 17
It is inaccurate to call it a school of thought. It is
a psychic mass rebellion against conditions that were in-
dubitably lamentable. It is a reaction to -the cycle of legal
oppression that accompanied capitalistic tyranny. It was
fated that such a reaction would come, but it is a pity that
it came in this way.
16 Hutchins, Legaj Education, 4 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 357, 361, 362 (1937).
17 Dillon, Philosophy in Law and Government, 13 Amxiam CATnoLc
P moEpc.AL AssociArAO Pioc n Cns 9 (1937).
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Natural Law concepts in American law had become twisted
and distorted so as to unduly protect capital at the ex-
pense of labor, to allow a laissez-faire, overly-rugged indi-
vidualism to flourish. Sociological jurisprudence made a
valiant attempt to evaluate the conflicting claims of indi-
viduals and society, and to harmonize the individual's inter-
ests with the welfare of society. Fortunately, ideals and
ethics were not cast aside. However, it has been stated
that: 18
. . . so far, this school of jurisprudence has devised no
theory of values other than the shifting ideals of the epoch.
Thus, sociological jurisprudence can do little more than
correct deficiencies and limitations of existing law and check
analytical and historical conceptions and those of other
schools from a functional viewpoint. The philosophy of the
school is pragmatic; it has faith in the improvement of
law through judicial experience, trial and error, and the
efficacy of effort ... With the ends of law and delineation
of interests derived as critiques, positive law is then inter-
preted so as t-. preserve the more important interests
(usually regarded as the social interests) and to withhold
recognition of such claims as are clearly immoral, unjust or
impractical of enforcement. Herein a danger lurks in always
giving precedence to social interests and in having no
stabilizing philosophy of law to direct the evaluation of
these conflicting individual and social claims. Stability of
law must always be preserved in the face of misconceived
and inadequate demands for change. Immediate ends de-
rived pragmatically cannot satisfy the need for stability
and predictability of law.
Such important men as Holmes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and
Pound have contributed to this school of thinking. Great
contributions to the growth of the law have resulted. Many
implications learned from the development of the social
sciences have found their rightful places in the law. The
factual data taken from the social sciences have allowed a
greater opportunity for the attainment of justice through
law. More "real life" was reflected in the law. However,
18 De Sloovere, Natural Law and Current Sociological Jurisprudene, 17
Ammurm CATxonrc P~nosowmcAL Assocr A PRocmrnr.s 140 (1941).
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one very important factor has been overlooked by this
school. Law has been viewed as having no absolute stand-
ard: only a standard that changes with the changing
epochs. Giving consideration to the social claims of the
present will throw more light on what laws should be
passed, but it will not determine if these claims are morally
correct. In viewing the law as a force to bring about social
good, this school of thought has a very laudable objective,
provided that rightful individual interests are properly pro-
tected. A balance between individualism and socialism
must prevail. Reforms brought about by this school have
contributed tremendously to overthrow former conceptions
of the law which allowed "rugged individualism" to flour-
ish. Selfish individual interests had obtained a legal cloak
under the protection of imperfectly understood "so-called
natural rights." Important social reforms did much to re-
aim the law toward the attainment of justice. But the
growth of the law cannot stop here if justice is to be more
fully realized. It is possible for the law to become too
concerned with the social interests and not sufficiently con-
cerned with individual interests. Important weaknesses in
society as well as in the individual can easily result from
such overemphasis. A proper evaluation of these conflict-
ing social and individual interests can be secured only in
the light of the moral law. Philosophy, particularly ethics,
is as necessary as the social sciences to set the limits be-
yond which social interests may not defeat individual inter-
ests, and vice versa. Unfortunately, Catholic law schools
have made only sporadic attempts to examine the law in
the light of the moral law, or Scholastic Philosophy. And
such an approach to the law has gained few followers
among lawyers or the public. If Catholic law schools and
law professors had fully realized that they were inheritors
of a theory of values which did not shift with the chang-
ing times, they could have supplied the normative stand.
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ard of the moral law to aid the Sociological jurists in their
search for greater justice.
The fourth school of jurisprudence influencing American
Law today is that of Realism. In describing this philosophy
of law, Walter B. Kennedy has said: 19
There is abroad today an American philosophy of law
which contests free will, denies the power of reason, scoffs
at the ability of a judge to decide the cases dispassionately,
questions the permanency and even the existence of rules
and principles, denies responsibility of man for willful
acts and derides a God-given law . . . The movement
assumed formidable proportions about a decade ago and
originated in certain law schools in this country. It is
essentially American in its origin and personnel, and its
adherents are drawn largely from the younger groups in
the law schools and in the legal profession.
The realists are strong on facts and dislike abstractions.
Judicial opinions, for them, are not based upon reason,
judgment and examination of cases. These are merely
cloaks to hide the true reasons for judicial decisions. What
the judge had for breakfast that morning, or his mental
disposition when he left home is emphasized as the im-
portant consideration. Watson and Freud are the favorite
psychologists of the extreme realists. "Bias, prejudice, en-
vironment, emotions, hunches, and indigestion are the raw
materials out of which law is fashioned." 20 Speaking anal-
ogously, the realists in law take a view of law much like
the realists in literature take a view of life. For the latter,
life is a sordid and filthy mess. There are no people with
ideals. There is no spiritual beauty in the world. Life
is merely a physical struggle of one person against another.
Life is hard and painful. The realists in law see no prin-
ciples based on a higher law. They magnify the weak-
nesses in man's ability to attain justice and enlarge his evil
19 Kennedy, Current Attacks Upon and Suggested Methods of Preserving
Neo-Scholastic. Jurisprudence, 13 Ai.ma=c CATHoUC PrLosopmcA . Asso-
ClATroN PRoczEDnros 186, 187 (1937).
20 Id. at 188.
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nature. Yet there is just enough truth in some of their
assertions to attract followers. People who have had un-
fortunate experiences with the law or who have adopted
a negative outlook on life are fertile soil for the develop-
ment of such a view of law. Because Realism embodies
such a 'head-on conflict with Christian thought, it is doubt-
ful if this type of thinking has made much influence on
Catholic legal education. Indeed in some respects, it has
not made enough! The realists' views, as has been indi-
cated, have not been completely erroneous. Some of their
opinions on the practical plane have been extremely cogent.
Many law schools, whether Catholic or not, have prepared
students to practice law in an atmosphere of unreality. It
has taken realists to point out the necessity for training
in legal drafting of instruments, for more trial court work,
and for more personal, supervised contact with litigation
processes. Thus, while their philosophy has been fallacious,
the Realists have shown the way to some worthwhile, prac-
tical reforms in present-day legal education.
The struggle of Catholic law schools to achieve a prop-
erly integrated law curriculum, in the face of these four
divergent philosophies of law, has been made easier by the
recent reorganization of legal studies at the University of
Chicago. There, in accordance with Christian principles,
the relationship of the rational sciences to law is specific-
ally recognized. Under Hutchins and Adler there has been
a reflection of Aristotelian concepts. While not completely
scholastic in its choice of moral starting points, legal edu-
cation is thought of in teleological terms.2" Principles
rather than facts have been considered as of the greatest
importance. There is a realization that facts do not ar-
range themselves into a science.2" Deduction has been em-
ployed as well as 'induction.
21 Brown, Legal Education in Philosophical Perspective, 3 Dmor L. REv.
188, 189 (1940).
22 Hutchins, Legal Education, 4 U. or CH . L. RLv. 357 (1937).
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In concluding the study of the nature of American law,
the origin and development of American Catholic legal edu-
cation and the philosophies of law which have influenced
that education, one becomes aware of the diverse and con-
flicting materials which are taught in Catholic law schools.
An awareness by law students of these diverse views of the
law is highly desirable. A critical appraisal of them would
do much to promote constructive efforts to achieve just
laws in our society. Lawyers taught to view laws in rela-
tion to the various philosophies of law are more quick to
realize the shortcomings or advantages of such laws. For
example, lawyers who are familiar with the influence of the
Socidlogical school of law should more readily see the ne-
cessity of passing laws to attain the greater good of society,
while a concurrent knowledge of the Scholastic view of law
should enable them to realize the necessity of a proper bal-
ance between the interests of society and those of the in-
dividual. The broad and basic thinking entailed in study-
ing the philosophy of law would aid lawyers to become
better leaders in their communities and better legislators in
their state and federal governments. Unfortunately, few
law students have appreciated the worth of such a far-
sighted view of the law as contrasted with the "more prac-
tical" aspects of the law; few law teachers have had the
training to see that deeper things lie in their teaching than
they have suspected; and few law schools have insisted
that their students understand these philosophies of law
and their immediately practical effects on our laws. It
would appear that Catholic law students, law teachers, and
law schools are as guilty as others of these deficiencies.
Insufficient knowledge of the philosophy of law has become
a characteristic of American Catholic, legal education. Few
Catholic law school students take courses in this field and
few Catholic law school professors are interested in it. It
is true that a study alone of these diverse philosophies of
the law would not be completely sufficient to insure better
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lawyers and better laws, but it certainly would be an im-
portant aid toward that end.
The study of legal philosophies must, of course, be con-
ducted in the light of an objective normative critique-a
standard outside of the positive law itself. The moral law
and the principles of ethics and politics derived therefrom
would go far in fulfilling this need. Catholic law schools,
as inheritors of a Scholastic philosophy of law and the
Scholastic concept of Natural Law, could provide such a
standard by which to appraise positive law. The establish-
ment of such a standard would answer the title question-
whether there is a distinctive philosophy of American
Catholic legal education-in the affirmative.
But can it be said that there is a philosophy of American
Catholic legal education in reality apart from theory? As a
consequence of the influence of these divergent and even
conflicting philosophies of law upon Catholic law schools,
and because of this type of school's imitativeness of other
law schools in the wholesale adoption of the case method
of studying law, the arrangement of courses and the like,
there are many who have questioned whether there is such
a reality as a truly Catholic law school. One writer has
classified these schools as at best only non-sectarian.23 An-
other has commented that there is no such thing as a dis-
tinctly Catholic law school. He points out that it takes its
curriculum and charter from the state, and trains in the
Common Law, statutes, and procedure. He argues there is
no difference between the Catholic and non-Catholic law
school so far as teaching Catholic Philosophy -is concern-
ed.24  However, William F. Clark, formerly Dean of the
University of DePaul Law School, believes that too great
zeal has prompted this false idea that there is no distinctly
Catholic law school. The simple fact that all schools teach
23 Kane, Our Colleges and the Law, 27 AMECA 549 (1922).
24 Curran, Catholic Law Schools, Truth Magazine, Mar., 1933p p. 3.
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the same courses is not the complete answer, he argues, for
it ignores the obvious fact that courses can be taught from
different viewpoints. The moral aspects of the law can be
and are stressed in some Catholic law schools. Likewise,
Catholic contributions to Equity and Trusts Law can be
and sometimes are taught. Finally, he points out that the
course in Legal Ethics can be and sometimes is made a
powerful force in teaching a Catholic practice of law.
The question still remains: Are there truly Catholic law
schools? To find out, one must formulate a definition as
to what a truly Catholic law school is, and then ascertain
if any of the Catholic 'law schools conform to this definition.
To obtain it, one need reflect upon the views of St. Thomas
Aquinas, who instead of looking merely at every law prob-
lem in the light of the specific situation, viewed these prob-
lems in relation to a Higher Law. Unification resulted from
knowing things in their higher causes. Hence, a truly
Catholic law school can be defined as one that views the
positive law in the light of the eternal law. This does not
mean that the school can offer a course in Legal Ethics or
Jurisprudence or -the Philosophy of Law along with the
other technical courses with the thought that the mere
offering makes it a Catholic law school. Rather it requires
that the entire law school training in the positive law be
viewed in the light of the eternal law. In each course,
wherever the moral law affects the positive law, its rela-
tionship must be seen and its implications felt. Only in
such manner will man's laws be kept subject to God's laws.
Thus the great contribution of Christianity to law, namely
the subjection of man's laws to a Higher Law, will be ful-
filled. Pope Pius XI in his great encyclical "The Christian
Education of Youth," wherein he defines a truly Catholic
school, subscribes to much 'the same viewpoint as St.
Thomas Aquinas. He says: 25
25 Pope Plus XI, Christian Education of Youth in F z GREAT E zCc-
LicAIs 30 (Paulist Press ed. 1939).
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It is necessary that all the teaching and the whole or-
ganization of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and
text-books in every branch, be regulated by the Christian
spirit, under the direction and maternal supervision of the
Church; so that religion may be in very truth the founda-
tion and crown of the youth's entire training.
One must not imply that a truly Catholic law school must
be so concerned with the Higher Law of God that there
will not be sufficient time spent on man's positive laws.
Man must work out his destiny on this earth, and hence
it is his own laws which he must put in order. Our Cath-
olic law teachers will have to exhibit that integration of the
supernatural and the natural which alone is fully Catholic.
Affirmation of the spiritual aspect of law alone will be in-
sufficient. The acute problem is how to hold the spiritual
and temporal together; for it is only together that each
can come into its own. The very -idea of university educa-
tion demands such unification.26 All the light obtainable
from every field of knowledge needs to be brought to bear
upon the development of the law. And such is a continual
process ever enlarging our knowledge of the law. Hap-
pily, the Scholastic view of the law, based as it is on the
dualism of matter and spirit, is able to absorb knowledge
from such diverse sources as the rational, social, and physi-
cal sciences, as well as all other fields of study. By using
the moral law as its standard and by recognizing that man's
law must contain both the eternal and the finite, a Scholas-
tic philosophy of law can absorb and arrange in orderly
fashion the truthful elements from all the various philoso-
phies of law which we have analyzed-including even Real-
ism. Thus a truly Catholic law school employing a neo-
Scholastic philosophy of law would not offer a purely
ethereal, idealistic approach to law, nor one overly realistic,
but rather one that recognizes and combines both the spir-
26 Clark, The Problem of the Catholic Law School, 3 DEmorr L. Rv.
169 (1940).
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itual and material elements in the law. Law would be
viewed both as a science and as an art.
Keeping the above-formulated definition in mind, are
there any truly Catholic law schools purportedly in exist-
ence today? The information available on this is not com-
plete; however, two surveys have been made in recent
years. One grew out of the Philosophy of Law section of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and the
second was authorized by the National Catholic Welfare
Conference. In the first survey over 300 questionnaires
were sent to Church, law school deans and professors (in-
cluding two non-Catholic, church law schools), and only
twenty-two replies were received! Only thirteen deans
answered. The article which published the results of this
survey rightly asked: "Does this indicate a tendency toward
considerable lethargy, in the church legal educational world,
with respect to problems involving juridical ideals?"2
The survey dealt with the jurisprudential aims of Church
law schools in the United States. The general conclusion
drawn was that there is no unanimity concerning these
aims. Fourteen out of twenty-two answered affirmatively
the question: 28
Should -the faculty members of law schools which con-
stitute parts of universities established by religious orders,
or by clerics, obviously for the purpose of giving a specific
type of education, undertake at the present time to develop
and present, in some degree, a legal culture produced by.
relating law to the other social sciences, under the influence
of a neo-scholastic philosophy?
Such a step, it was contemplated, would point out, with
concrete examples, where there was essential harmony or
discord between the positive law and Scholastic principles,
and would trace the influence of Scholasticism on positive
27 Brown, Jurisprudent al Aims of Church Law Schools in the United
States, 13 NoTa DAmm LAwYER 166 (1938).
28 Id. at 167.
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law in the past as well as indicate the ideal of the future.
The second question in this survey asked: 29
Should the courses in the undergraduate legal curriculum,
such as contracts, torts, and the like, be taught in church
law schools, in exactly the same manner in which they are
presented in non-church law schools?
Most replies said there should not be identity of teaching
method. A majority approved an explanation in every
course of the moral background of underlying principles
or a warning against positivism or a suggestion of a con-
nection between the positive law and Scholasticism. A
minority thought jurisprudential critique should be given
in certain courses only, believing that in some others there
was nothing contrary to Catholic Ethics.
The fifth question asked in this survey was an interest-
ing one. It read "What, if anything, are you doing in the
particular courses which you teach to give them a distinc-
tive tone with reference to church scholarship?" 30 This
question was asked with the idea of making available for
the benefit of all legal educators the specific activities of
those who were infusing a scholasticized jurisprudence into
their law courses. A few answers stated that the writers
did nothing in their classes to bring out the distinctively
Scholastic aspects of the subject taught, because they did
not favor such a procedure or because their school was said
to be non-sectarian, "thus confusing theology and philoso-
phy." 31 Some expounded Scholastic ethics in legal ethics
courses, or integrated law and Scholastic Philosophy. Some
emphasized the importance of the Church in legal history,
while others unfolded the doctrine of natural rights or
brought out the sound philosophy at the root of the Com-
mon Law. Some pointed out that Natural Law was basic
to International law, while others raised certain specific
ethical questions regarding particular legal rules and cases.
29 Id. at 171.
30 Id. at 181.
31 Id. at 182.
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And teachers of Equity mentioned the influence of the great
Ecclesiastics.
In drawing conclusions from this survey, it was stated
that: 32
. . . the success of the Scholastic jurisprudence movement
depends upon replacing the general with the specific. Some
of the replies demonstrate that this can be done, and that
there is a capacity, coupled with a willingness, on the part
of at least some of the educators in church law schools
to evolve a masterful jurisprudence, molded by scholasticism.
Should not the next step be a collaboration by such teach-
ers?
It is evident from the lack of replies to this survey, never-
theless, that far too little interest exists in developing a
philosophy of American Catholic legal education.
The second survey was authorized by the Department
of Education of the National Catholic Welfare Confer-
ence. Questionnaires were sent to all the deans of Cath-
olic law schools; also, an analysis of the catalogues of these
schools was made. The survey seems to indicate the con-
cern of the N. C. W. C. that the technical and vocational
characteristics of Catholic law schools may be overshadow-
ing the Catholic purposes of legal education. The conclu-
sions reached from -this study are as follows: 11
. . . among those institutions which seek to effectuate
definite jurisprudential aims, much diversity exists as to the
proper manner of presenting a philosophy of law. The
majority method of accomplishing this was by a special
course, or a few formal lectures given to first year students.
The minority alternative technique was by introducing a
quantity of scholastic jurisprudence into all the positive
law courses.
Evidently the majority of Catholic law schools do not think
it necessary or have not yet found it feasible to analyze
the law taught in each of their positive law -ourses in the
light of the moral law. It is encouraging to find that at
32 Id. at 185.
33 Brown, The Place of the Catholic Law School in American Education,
5 Dmmorr L. Rv. 11 (1941).
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least some do adopt that approach. It is to be expected
that those Catholic law school professors and deans who
are not familiar with the great Scholastic tradition are un-
aware of what it has previously contributed to the law and
what it can contribute in the future.
There have been other important reasons for the failure
to develop more extensively Catholic law schools possess-
ing a distinctive philosophy of legal education. This same
survey revealed that, "The chief reasons given for failure
to make a greater contribution to the science of law were
heavy teaching schedules, absence of research assistance,
and inadequacy of library." " In speaking of another im-
portant reason, Dr. Brendan Brown, author of the article
which published the results of the survey, has this observa-
tion to make: "
Retardation in the unfolding powers of Catholic law
schools to fulfill their supreme destiny as master-architects
of professional standards and a regime of jurisprudence
under the sway and ethical discipline of the philosophical
and juridical ideal of re-examined and re-formulated scho-
lastic thought has been due in no small measure to lack of
financial encouragement and endowment. To effect an equi-
librium between the duty of Catholic wealth to foster the
Catholic system of legal education and the obligation of
this system to supply the correct educational objectives, to
entrench itself upon an eleemosynary plane, and to supple-
ment technical functions with processes which will transform
Catholic law schools into dynamic centers for the promo-
tion of the scholastic interest constitutes a major problem.
Upon its adequate solution depends the success of Catholic
legal education in its march toward the lofty peaks of
enduring achievement in the pedagogical, scientific, and
spiritual spheres.
The investigation that we have made in this paper to de-
termine if there is a philosophy of American Catholic legal
education would not be complete without noting that in
recent years there has been a revival of Natural Law in
84 Id. at 10.
35 Id. at 3.
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the theo-philosophical or Scholastic sense, especially among
Catholic philosophers, and also there has been a movement
started among Catholic law and philosophy professors under
the auspices of the American Catholic Philosophical Associ-
ation for the development of a Neo-Scholastic philosophy of
law. This movement began in December, 1932, and consti-
tuted an innovation for Catholic philosophers and jurists in
this country. Excepting the war years, this group has had
almost annual meetings, at which time papers have been
given and discussions held on Neo-Scholastic philosophy of
law. In 1937 the movement recognized the need of a text-
book on jurisprudence in general and on Neo-Scholastic
philosophy of law in particular, suitable for the law stu-
dents of today. However, to date no book has been pub-
lished; nor have any really cooperative efforts been made
to develop a Neo-Scholastic philosophy of law. Miriam
Theresa Rooney, the scholarly chronicler of the organiza-
tion, has said: "The movement for a Neo-Scholastic Phil-
osophy of Law in America ... has a real function to per-
form in contemporary culture, but . . . its achievements
so far have not yet attained major worth." 6
While there is in the legal world a considerable quantity
of contemporary literature on the philosophy of the positive
law, and a fair amount of it is written by Catholic phil-
osophers and jurists, yet there is a terrific paucity of liter-
ature concerning the topic of this paper and the develop-
ment of a Neo-Scholastic philosophy of law. The numer-
ous articles on the Natural Law are a great help, but still
leave much to be desired with respect to 'implementation
with the positive law. That not enough has been done is
a cogent indication of the enormity of the job. Sporadic
movements towards the accomplishment of this great task
have been made by Catholic law school professors, deans,
36 Rooney, The Movement for a Neo-Scholastic Philosophy of Law in
America, 18 AM=CAN CATHO.M PHLOSO ICAL Assoc.ATION PRORcSnrcs 201
(1942).
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and the schools themselves. Fortunately, Scholastic phil-
osophy, on which Catholic legal education can draw to de-
velop its philosophy of law, has probed deeply into human
relations, into the nature of man, his origin, and his end.
It is an ancient and yet ever modem repository of wisdom,
and stands ready to guide Catholic legal education to pru-
dent answers to the grave social, economic, political and
moral problems that confront the law. It can point the
way in preventing legislatures from manifesting utilitarian
attitudes; it can help lawyers to think of themselves as
agents of the court for the attainment of justice, as in truth
they are; it can exert an effective influence to prevent the
practice of law from becoming merely a game of wits and
sharp dealings; in short, it can truly help to attain a better
administration of justice. Catholic law schools, fortified
with the basic Christian philosophy of American law, are
in a singular position to protect the inalienable rights of
man. With more vision and energy, Catholic legal educa-
tion can go far in ". . . molding the plastic clay of the
positive law so that it will reveal the image of a jurispru-
dence expressive of all the great scholastic truths relating
to man in society with his manifold relationships." "
Thus concludes our analysis of the nature, origin, and
purpose of American Catholic legal education. The answer
to our question-whether there is a distinctive philosophy
of American Catholic legal education--can be answered at
least partially in the affirmative. But the philosophy is
clearly in its embryonic stage. Its practical realization lies
ahead.
Bernard I. Feeney
37 Brown, The Place of the Catholic Law School in American Education,
5 DET-on- L. REv. 18 (1941).
